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FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S JURISPRUDENCE OF THE PATENT-ELIGIBILITY
ANALYSIS: TOWARD A BRIGHT-LINE RULE
PING-HSUN CHEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions
of matter are “four independent categories of inventions or discoveries that are eligible
for [patent] protection.” 1 But, the Supreme Court has recognized three patentineligible subject matters: laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.2
In 2014, the Supreme Court in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l 3
inherited the eligibility analysis used in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.4 and finalized a two-step approach to patent-eligibility.5 The Alice
standard applies to claims related to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas.6
Under Alice, the first step is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.”7 If so, then the second step is to
“consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’
to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into
a patent-eligible application.”8 Specifically, the second step searches for “an inventive
* © Associate Professor, Graduate Institute of Technology, Innovation and Intellectual Property
Management, National Chengchi University. J.D. 2010 & LL.M. 2008, Washington University in St.
Louis School of Law; LL.M. 2007, National Chengchi University, Taiwan; B.S. 1997 & M.S. 1999 in
Chem. Eng., National Taiwan University, Taiwan.
1 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2021) (“Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent”).
2 See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 601 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
3 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
4 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
5 See Ping-Hsun Chen, Patent-Eligibility Standard for Network Architecture Patents Under the
Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2019) (illustrating the Alice
standard for determining patent-eligibility of a patent claim) [hereinafter, Chen, Patent-Eligibility
Standard]; see also Alice Corp. Pty., 573 U.S. at 217; CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 955 F.3d
1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Elaine H. Nguyen, Scalpels Over Sledgehammers: Saving Diagnostic
Patents Through Judicial Intervention Rather Than Legislative Override, 70 DUKE L.J. 1631, 1643–
44 (2021) (introducing the Alice standard); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Law, Fact, and Patent Validity, 106
IOWA L. REV. 607, 622 (2021) (explaining the Alice standard). Nowadays when applying the § 101
analysis, district courts may still make a mistake “at the foundational stage” by “characterize[ing] the
claims without mention of what, for at least some (perhaps all) of the claims at issue, the claim
language and specifications make clear are important parts of what the patents assert are the
advances in the art.” Realtime Data LLC v. Reduxio Sys., Inc., 831 F. App’x 492, 499 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(J. Taranto, concurring).
6 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 573 U.S. at 217 (“In [Mayo], we set forth a framework for distinguishing
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.”); see also Minki Kwon, Waiting for Godot: A Proposal
for the Supreme Court to Revisit Post-Mayo Patent Eligibility Question, 48 AIPLA Q.J. 489, 507–08
(2020) (describing the Alice standard (Mayo/Alice test)).
7 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 573 U.S. at 217.
8 Id.
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concept—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.”9
The Alice court has cautioned that a claim directed to a patent-ineligible
subject matter “must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [ineligible subject matter].’” 10 Thus,
to pass step two, a claim must “more than simply stat[e] the [ineligible subject matter]
while adding the words ‘apply it.’” 11 Likewise, a claim fails the step-two analysis if it
“[s]imply append[s] conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality.”12
In addition, the Alice court has noted that “[t]he introduction of a computer
into the claims does not alter the [step-two] analysis.”13 Under Alice, “limiting the use
of an [ineligible subject matter] to a particular technological environment” is “not
enough for patent eligibility.” 14 One example is “recitation of a computer [which]
amounts to a mere instruction to ‘implemen[t]’ an abstract idea ‘on . . . a computer.’”15
The same analysis applies to “system claims [which] recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement [an abstract] idea.”16
When the Federal Circuit started to apply the Alice standard, Professor Annal
D. Vyas criticized that “courts lack a workable framework to determine whether an
idea is abstract” and cannot cohesively assess what constitutes an inventive concept.17
Criticism on the Alice standard has been growing because, as Michael Xun Liu
observed, “the two-step process for evaluating patent eligibility fails to provide
sufficient clarity for lower courts, the PTO, and practitioners.”18 Consequently, calling

9 Id. at 217–18 (alterations in original, emphasis in original, and internal quotation marks
omitted).
10 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 573 U.S. at 221 (first alteration being in original); see also Mayo
Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 77 (“If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process
reciting a law of nature, unless that process has additional features that provide practical assurance
that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”).
11 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd, 573 U.S. at 221; see also Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 72 (“Still,
as the Court has also made clear, to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible
application of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the
words ‘apply it.’” (emphasis in original)).
12 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 573 U.S. at 222; see also Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 82 (“Other
cases offer further support for the view that simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high
level of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot make those laws,
phenomena, and ideas patentable.”).
13 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 573 U.S. at 222.
14 Id. at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 Id. at 223 (second alteration in original).
16 Id. at 226.
17 See Annal D. Vyas, Alice in Wonderland v. CLS Bank: The Supreme Court’s Fantastic
Adventure into Section 101 Abstract Idea Jurisprudence, 9 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 18–22 (2015).
18 Michael Xun Liu, Subject Matter Eligibility and Functional Claiming in Software Patents, 20
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 227, 254–55 (2018). See also Mark A. Perry & Jaysen Chung, Alice at Six: Patent
Eligibility Comes of Age, 20 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 64, 65 (2021) (“Although simple in conception,
the distinction between the three categories of patent-ineligible subject matter and patent-eligible
inventions can be difficult to apply in practice.”); Daryl Lim, The Influence of Alice, 105 MINN. L. REV.
345, 346 (2021) (“The concern with Alice is not simply that its standards are too narrow but rather
that Alice’s standards are virtually indiscernible.”).
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for amending § 101 to abrogate the Supreme Court’s patent-eligibility standard has
been circulated among scholars and practitioners.19
However, this paper attempts to demonstrate the Federal Circuit’s efforts to
provide workable approaches to apply step one and step two. Next, Part II discusses
how the Federal Circuit looks to claim language and specification to determine
whether a claim is directed to a patent-ineligible subject matter. Part III illustrates
that the Federal Circuit may have developed a workable standard for determining
whether a claim encompasses an inventive concept by asking whether the alleged
inventive concept is not well-understood, routine, and conventional in light of the
specification. Finally, Part IV presents why a bright-line rule for applying the Alice
Standard has been formed.
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO STEP ONE
Since Alice, while applying step one by a common law methodology, 20 the
Federal Circuit has developed some specific approaches to step one in three aspects.21
A. Claim Language as the Center of the Alice Step One Analysis
The first aspect is how to define a disputed claim for purposes of the step one
analysis.22 In 2015, the Federal Circuit in Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.
first stated that “the claims are considered in their entirety to ascertain whether their
character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” 23 However in 2016, the
Federal Circuit in In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Pat. Litig. cautioned that courts “must be
careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims because [a]t some level, all
inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”24
In 2019, the Federal Circuit in ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc. clarified
that to what extent this entirety approach may permit courts to consider a
19 See, e.g., Jorge A. Goldstein, Michelle K. Holoubek, & Krishan Y. Thakker, The Time Has Come
to Amend 35 U.S.C. § 101, 44 AIPLA Q.J. 171, 173–74 (2016) (introducing a proposed amendment that
removes the “inventive concept” requirement from 35 U.S.C. § 101); Christian Dorman, “One if by
Land, Two if by Sea”: The Federal Circuit’s Oversimplification of Computer-Implemented
Mathematical Algorithms, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 285, 309–11 (2018) (introducing activities
attempting to amend 35 U.S.C. § 101); Tanner Mort, Abstract Ideas: The Time Has Come for Congress
to Address the Patentability of Software and Business Method Inventions, 56 IDAHO L. REV. 383, 416–
17 (2020) (discussing a proposed 35 U.S.C. § 101 that defines “inventive concept” specifically).
20 See Hung H. Bui, A Common Sense Approach to Implement the Supreme Court’s Alice Two-Step
Framework to Provide “Certainty” and “Predictability”, 100 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 165, 219
(2018) (describing the Federal Circuit’s decision in Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841
F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also Amdocs (Israel) Ltd., 841 F.3d at 1294–95.
21 See Chen, Patent-Eligibility Standard, supra note 5, at 7–9.
22 See Chen, Patent-Eligibility Standard, supra note 5, at 8; see also Dustin Luettgen, A Logical
and Lawful Application of § 101 Jurisprudence: The USPTO’s 2019 Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 28 J.L. & POL’Y 445, 465–66 (2020) (describing ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920
F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
23 Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis
added).
24 In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Pat. Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted and the first alteration in original).
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specification.25 The ChargePoint court stated that “we have found the specification
helpful in illuminating what a claim is ‘directed to.’” 26 The ChargePoint court
recognized that “in some cases the ‘directed to’ inquiry may require claim construction,
which will often involve consideration of the specification.” 27 In addition, the
ChargePoint court noted that “[t]he ‘directed to’ inquiry may also involve looking to the
specification to understand “the problem facing the inventor” and, ultimately, what
the patent describes as the invention.”28 However, the ChargePoint court cautioned
that “while the specification may help illuminate the true focus of a claim, when
analyzing patent eligibility, reliance on the specification must always yield to the claim
language in identifying that focus.”29
Recently in 2020, the Federal Circuit in CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc
confirmed that step one allows courts to “consider the patent’s written description, as
it informs our understanding of the claims.” 30 Additionally, the CardioNet court
clarified that step one disregards “whether the prior art demonstrates that the idea or
other aspects of the claim are known, unknown, conventional, unconventional, routine,
or not routine.”31 The CardioNet court emphasized that prior art evidence is used
merely for analyzing novelty and obviousness questions. 32 Ultimately, the CardioNet
court held that step one “does not require an evaluation of the prior art or facts outside
of the intrinsic record regarding the state of the art at the time of the invention.”33
It should be noted that CardioNet, LLC does not mean “that it is impermissible
for courts to ‘look[ ] outside the intrinsic evidence’ as part of their Alice step one inquiry
or that all evidence presented by the parties.” 34 Rather, CardioNet, LLC merely
provides that “there is no basis for requiring, as a matter of law, consideration of the
prior art in the step one analysis in every case.”35 Therefore, “[i]f the extrinsic evidence
is overwhelming to the point of being indisputable, then a court could take [judicial]
notice of that and find the claims directed to the [ineligible subject matter.]”36

See infra Part II.A; ChargePoint, Inc., 920 F.3d at 766.
Id. at 766.
27 Id. at 767.
28 Id. at 767.
29 Id. at 766.
30 CardioNet, LLC, 955 F.3d at 1368.
31 Id. at 1372.
32 Id. at 1373.
33 Id. at 1374.
34 Id. at 1373 (emphasis and alteration in original and internal citation omitted).
35 Id. at 1373 (emphasis added).
36 Id. at 1373–74.
25
26
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B. Improvement Test
The second aspect focuses on improvement contributed by the claimed
invention.37 In 2016, the Federal Circuit developed this improvement test in three
cases related to computer or software technologies.38
In Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit first held that step one
“asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities (i.e., the self-referential table for a computer database) or,
instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are
invoked merely as a tool.”39 Later, the Federal Circuit in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc. looked to whether the disputed claims “focus on a specific means or
method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or
effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery.”40
The improvement test was phrased differently in Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v.
DIRECTV, LLC, where the Federal Circuit held that step one “look[s] at the ‘focus of
the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’
is directed to excluded subject matter.” 41 Nevertheless, the Affinity court eventually
found that the disputed claim was “not directed to the solution of a ‘technological
problem,’ nor [was] it directed to an improvement in computer or network
functionality.”42 In 2019, the Federal Circuit in Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC
merged the first aspect and second aspect by stating that step one “evaluate[s] ‘the
focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the character of the
claim as a whole, considered in light of the specification, is directed to excluded subject
matter.”43
Notably, the Affinity court did not cite any prior art references when it provided
step one analysis,44 so “prior art” mentioned by the Affinity court does not have to be a

37 See Ted G. Dane, Are the Federal Circuit’s Recent Section 101 Decisions A “Specific
Improvement” in Patent Eligibility Law?, 26 FED . CIRCUIT B.J. 331, 345–59 (2017) (discussing how
the Federal Circuit looked to improvement made by the disputed claims in some cases).
38 See infra Part II.B.
39 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). The
court in Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC recognized that in Enfish, LLC, “we
found claim language reciting the invention’s specific improvements to help our determination in step
one of the Alice framework that the invention was directed to those specific improvements in computer
technology.” 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original).
40 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis
added) (citing Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d at 1336; Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d
1042, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
41 Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis
added).
42 Id. at 1262 (emphasis added and internal citation omitted).
43 Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (emphasis added)
(citing Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC, 838 F.3d at 1257)).
44 See Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC, 838 F.3d at 1258–62.
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kind of prior art for novelty or obviousness analyses. 45 In addition, requiring an
advance over the prior art does not turn the Affinity approach into an obviousness
analysis because, although “commercial success” may overcome a finding of
obviousness,46 the Federal Circuit in Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc. has stated
that “[c]ommercial success is not necessarily a proxy for an improvement in a
technology nor does it necessarily indicate that claims were drawn to patent eligible
subject matter.”47
After years of evolution, the improvement test has required a claimed
improvement to be “specific.” 48 In 2018, the Federal Circuit in Ancora Techs., Inc. v.
HTC Am., Inc. found that “[i]mproving security—here, against a computer’s
unauthorized use of a program—can be a non-abstract computer-functionality
improvement if done by a specific technique that departs from earlier approaches to
solve a specific computer problem.”49 In 2019, the Federal Circuit in Koninklijke KPN
N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH noted that “[a]n improved result, without more stated in
the claim, is not enough to confer eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea.” 50 In 2020,
the Federal Circuit in TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc. concluded that the improvement test
asks two inquiries: (1) “whether the focus of the claimed advance is on a solution to ‘a
problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks’ or computers” and (2)
“whether the claim is properly characterized as identifying a ‘specific’ improvement in
computer capabilities or network functionality, rather than only claiming a desirable
result or function.”51
Recently in 2021, the Federal Circuit in In re Mohapatra seemed to offer a new
approach to step one by “look[ing] to whether the claims are sufficiently concrete or
specific to be directed to a patent-eligible process rather than a patent-ineligible
45 See also Jasper L. Tran & J. Sean Benevento, Alice at Five, 2019 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 25, 29
(2019) (“The specification can provide helpful evidence to support eligibility, if it identifies particular
improvements over the prior art.”). “Prior arts” are defined in 35 U.S.C. § 102 and generally mean any
forms of information available to the public before the patent filing date. See Timothy R. Holbrook,
Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1462–79 (2016) (introducing prior arts under the
1952 Patent Act and the America Invents Act). In a typical analysis of novelty (or anticipation), a
claim is invalid “if a single prior art reference discloses each and every limitation of the claimed
invention.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In a typical
obviousness analysis, courts consider factual findings such as “the scope and content of the prior art;
the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention; the level of ordinary skill in the field
of the invention; [] objective considerations such as commercial success, long-felt need, and the failure
of others[; and] the motivation to select and combine specified teachings of the prior art.” Canfield
Sci., Inc. v. Melanoscan, LLC, 987 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted).
46 See Canfield Sci., Inc., 987 F.3d at 1378.
47 Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015), abrogated on
other grounds by SIPCO, LLC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 980 F.3d 865, 870 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
48 See infra Part II.B.
49 Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018), as amended (Nov.
20, 2018) (emphasis added). See cf. Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[I]t is not enough, however, to merely improve a fundamental practice or
abstract process by invoking a computer merely as a tool.” (emphasis added)).
50 Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (emphasis
added).
51 TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., 978 F.3d 1278, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). See
also Customedia Techs., LLC, 951 F.3d at 1364 (“To be a patent-eligible improvement to computer
functionality, we have required the claims to be directed to an improvement in the functionality of the
computer or network platform itself.”).
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result.”52 But, this idea is actually from SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC of which the
step one analysis was partially based on a view that the disputed claims in McRO, Inc.
“had the specificity required to transform a claim from one claiming only a result to
one claiming a way of achieving it.” 53 Eventually, the Mohapatra court adopted the
McRO approach to “look to whether the claims in the patent focus on a specific means
or method, or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea
and merely invokes generic processes and machinery.”54
C. Laundry List of Claims Directed to a Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
The third aspect is that the Federal Circuit has created a laundry list of claims
directed to patent-ineligible subject matters. 55 For example, in 2016, the Federal
Circuit in Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A. summarized four categories of claims
directed to an abstract idea that deals with information. 56 Since 2020, the Federal
Circuit has conceptualized many examples regarding what claim should fall within an
abstract idea.57
Those patent-ineligible claims can be categorized into four groups. The first
group involves information processing, including: (1) “collecting information, including
when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as
information)”58; (2) “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds,
or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes”59; (3)
“merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation)” 60; (4)
the combination of collecting, analyzing, and presenting information61; (5) “tailoring
the provision of information to a user’s characteristics, such as location”; 62 (6) “merely
displaying data by conventional methods as part of a series of abstract steps”63; (7) “the
ideas of encoding and decoding image data and of converting formats, including when
52 In re Mohapatra, 842 F. App’x 635, 638 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
53 SAP Am., Inc., 898 F.3d at 1167 (citing McRO, Inc., 837 F.3d at 1314).
54 Mohapatra, 842 F. App’x at 638 (quoting Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns,
LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing McRO, Inc., 837 F.3d at 1314).
55 See Luettgen, supra note 22, at 480 (describing how a patent examiner should approach step
one analysis under the USPTO’s 2019 Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance that provides a list of
categories of patent-ineligible subject matters).
56 See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
57 See, e.g., Brit. Telecomms. PLC v. IAC/InterActiveCorp, 813 F. App’x 584, 587 (Fed. Cir. 2020);
CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 816 F. App’x 471, 475 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Adaptive Streaming Inc. v.
Netflix, Inc., 836 F. App’x 900, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Mortg. Application Techs., LLC v. MeridianLink,
Inc., 839 F. App’x 520, 526 (Fed. Cir. 2021); WhitServe LLC v. Donuts Inc., 809 F. App’x 929, 933 (Fed.
Cir. 2020); Bozeman Fin. LLC v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Atlanta, 955 F.3d 971, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Elec.
Commc’n Techs., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC, 958 F.3d 1178, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Ericsson
Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2020); In re Abel, 838 F.
App’x 558, 561 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
58 Elec. Power Grp., LLC, 830 F.3d at 1353.
59 Id. at 1354.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Brit. Telecomms. PLC, 813 F. App’x at 587.
63 CardioNet, LLC, 816 F. App’x at 475.
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data is received from one medium and sent along through another, are by themselves
abstract ideas” and “claims focused on those general ideas governing basic
communication practices, not on any more specific purported advance in
implementation” 64 ; (8) “information storage and exchange,” even where “it uses
computers as a tool or is limited to a particular technological environment” and “[t]he
mere automation of the exchange and storage of information.”65
The second group is concerned with commercial activities, including: (1)
“[c]arrying out fundamental economic practices involving simple information exchange”
and “use of standard computers and networks to carry out those functions—more
speedily, more efficiently, more reliably”66; (2) “[f]undamental economic practice[s] long
prevalent in our system of commerce”67; (3) “the process of recording authentication
information—such as the customer’s name, address, and telephone number—and
including that information in a subsequent communication with the customer.”68
The third group focuses on what humans can do, including: (1) “giving a
message to an intermediary who, unlike the sender, knows the intended recipient’s
location”; (2) “filtering [internet] content”; (3) “tracking financial transactions to
determine whether they exceed a pre-set spending limit”; (4) “using a marking affixed
to the outside of a mail object to communicate information about the mail object”; (5)
protecting privacy of message recipient.69
The fourth group relates to human minds, including: (1) “[c]ontrolling access
to resources [as] exactly the sort of process that ‘can be performed in the human mind,
or by a human using a pen and paper’” 70; (2) “a process that can be and has been
performed by humans without the use of a computer.”71

Adaptive Streaming Inc., 836 F. App’x at 903 (emphasis added).
Mortg. Application Techs., LLC, 839 F. App’x at 526.
66 WhitServe LLC, 809 F. App’x at 933 (emphasis added).
67 Bozeman Fin. LLC, 955 F.3d at 978 (emphasis added, second alteration in original and internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611, but indirectly quoting Judge Rader’s
dissenting opinion in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
68 Elec. Commc’n Techs., LLC, 958 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (stating that such the process
“is abstract not only because it is a longstanding commercial practice, but also because it amounts to
nothing more than gathering, storing, and transmitting information.”); see also WhitServe LLC v.
Dropbox, Inc., 854 F. App’x 367, 371 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“In other words, the system is for requesting,
transmitting, receiving, copying, deleting, and storing data records. Such transmitting, saving, and
storing of client records is a fundamental business practice that ‘existed well before the advent of
computers and the Internet’”).
69 See Abel, 838 F. App’x at 561 (citations omitted).
70 Ericsson Inc., 955 F.3d at 1327.
71 Mortg. Application Techs., LLC, 839 F. App’x at 526 (indicating that such a process may be
shown by the prosecution history).
64
65
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III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO STEP TWO
As for step two, the Federal Circuit also applies a common law methodology to
search for an inventive concept.72 In Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., the
Federal Circuit has described that it examines first “eligible and ineligible claims of a
similar nature from past cases” and then “the claims in the patents at issue to
determine whether the trial court was correct in ruling them all to be invalid under
§ 101.”73
However, the Federal Circuit has developed an “unconventionality” approach
to step two.74 For instance, in Berkheimer v. HP Inc., the Federal Circuit stated that
step two “[t]he second step of the Alice test is satisfied when the claim limitations
involve more than performance of well-understood, routine, [and] conventional
activities previously known to the industry.” 75 There, the Federal Circuit opined that
some disputed claims “contain[ed] limitations directed to the arguably unconventional
inventive concept described in the specification.”76
The unconventionality approach originates from Mayo Collaborative Servs.77
There, in determining whether an inventive concept existed in the disputed claims to
ensure that “that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the natural law itself,” the Supreme Court criticized that “the steps in the
claimed processes (apart from the natural laws themselves) involve well-understood,
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.” 78
Later, in Alice, when analyzing each step in the disputed claims, the Supreme Court
opined that “all of these computer functions [performed at the claimed steps] are ‘wellunderstood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.”79
72 See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd., 841 F.3d at 1294–95 (“Instead of a definition, then, the decisional
mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive
nature can be seen—what prior cases were about, and which way they were decided.”). One
commentator observed that the patent-eligibility issue has become a mirror issue of obviousness. See
Paxton M. Lewis, The Conflation of Patent Eligibility and Obviousness: Alice’s Substitution of Section
103, 2017 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW 13, 27–28 (2017).
73 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd., 841 F.3d at 1295, 1299.
74 See Ping-Hsun Chen, Federal Circuit’s Unconventionality Approach to Patent-Ineligibility
Challenges in a Motion to Dismiss, 20 UIC REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 331, 338–53 (2021) (describing how
the Federal Circuit determined an inventive concept by looking for any unconventional feature recited
in the claim) [hereinafter, Chen, Federal Circuit’s Unconventionality Approach].
75 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis added, alteration in
original and quotation marks omitted).
76 Id. at 1370 (emphasis added).
77 See Michael R. Woodward, Amending Alice: Eliminating the Undue Burden of “Significantly
More”, 81 ALB. L. REV. 329, 337–38 (2018) (commenting that requiring the claimed steps to do more
than “consist of well-understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific
community” is a form of novelty and obviousness analysis).
78 Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 73.
79 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 573 U.S. at 225 (second alteration in original) (citing Mayo Collaborative
Servs., 566 U.S. at 73). See also Kwon, supra note 6, at 508 (stating that under Alice, “if the claim only
involves ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activity,’ the court must find the claim patent
ineligible”); Michael Gershoni, An Argument Against Reinventing the Wheel: Using an Obviousness
Analysis to Bring Consistency and Clarity to Patent Eligibility Determinations of Software Patents
After Alice Corp., 44 AIPLA Q.J. 295, 309 (2016) (“Alice holds that combining a ‘long prevalent’ idea
and a ‘generic’ machine to perform ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities’ is
insufficient to constitute an inventive concept” (alteration in original)).
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This “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” notion first appeared in
PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., a post-Mayo, pre-Alice case, where the Federal
Circuit noted that “[p]rocess claims fail this [‘inventive concept’] requirement if, apart
from the ineligible concept, they contain nothing more than ‘well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.’” 80 The second
post-Mayo, pre-Alice case, SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Lab’ys, SA,
proposed that “Mayo demanded that, when a claim involves an abstract idea (or, in
Mayo itself, a law of nature), eligibility under section 101 requires that the claim
involve ‘enough’ else—applying the idea in the realm of tangible physical objects (for
product claims) or physical actions (for process claims)—that is beyond ‘wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity.’”81
After Alice, the Federal Circuit in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC
acknowledged that to pass step two a claim must include “additional features” and for
the first time required that “those ‘additional features’ must be more than ‘wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity.’” 82 Since then, this “more than” notion has
appeared in several later decisions. 83 The “more than” notion may be phrased
differently. For instance, the Federal Circuit in Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect,
Inc. held that “[a]t step two, more is required than ‘well-understood, routine,
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community,’ which fails to
transform the claim into ‘significantly more than a patent upon the’ ineligible concept
itself.”84 In FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., the Federal Circuit expressively
required that “[t]his inventive concept must do more than simply recite ‘wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity.’”85
However, the “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” notion is
occasionally presented in a negative tune. For example, in Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Symantec Corp., the Federal Circuit opined that “‘[s]imply appending conventional
steps, specified at a high level of generality,’ which are ‘well known in the art’ and
consist of ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously engaged in by
PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 F. App’x 65, 68 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Lab’ys, SA, 555 F. App’x 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(emphasis added). See also Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“That is, under the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or
natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive
concept necessary for patent eligibility; instead, the application must provide something inventive,
beyond mere ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activity.’”) (emphasis added) (a post-Alice case);
INO Therapeutics LLC v. Praxair Distrib. Inc., 782 F. App’x 1001, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
82 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). See also
Vyas, supra note 17, at 16 (analyzing the Ultramercial decision).
83 See, e.g., Shortridge v. Found. Constr. Payroll Serv., LLC, 655 F. App’x 848, 852 (Fed. Cir.
2016); In re Chorna, 656 F. App’x 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Affinity Labs of Tex., 838 F.3d at 1262;
Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Cap. One Fin. Corp.,
850 F.3d at 1341; Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1373–74 (Fed.
Cir. 2017); Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 711 F. App’x 1012, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re
Morinville, 767 F. App’x 964, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2019); In re Morsa, 809 F. App’x 913, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2020);
Mortg. Application Techs., LLC v. MeridianLink, Inc., 839 F. App’x 520, 526 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
84 Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd., 827 F.3d at 1047 (emphasis added). See also Smartflash LLC v. Apple
Inc., 680 F. App’x 977, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
85 FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).
See also GREE, Inc. v. Supercell Oy, 834 F. App’x 583, 588 (Fed. Cir. 2020); NetSoc, LLC v. Match
Grp., LLC, 838 F. App’x 544, 547 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
80
81
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workers in the field, is not sufficient to supply the inventive concept.”86 In ChargePoint,
Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., the Federal Circuit stated that “[t]hese additional features
cannot simply be ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known
to the industry.”87
In some cases, the application of the “well-understood, routine, conventional
activity” notion focuses on “conventional activity.” 88 For instance, in Bascom Glob.
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, the Federal Circuit recognized the patenteligibility analysis is “to consider whether various claim elements simply recite “wellunderstood, routine, conventional activit[ies].” 89 But, the Bascom court found that “[a]s
is the case here, an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and nongeneric arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” 90 In Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit,
Inc., the Federal Circuit required that “[a]n inventive concept reflects something more
than the application of an abstract idea using ‘well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” 91 But, the Cellspin court
held that “[w]e have no basis, at the pleadings stage, to say that these claimed
techniques, among others, were well-known or conventional as a matter of law.”92
In 2019, the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co.
deviated from its traditional application of the “well-understood, routine, conventional
activity” notion by stating that under step two “[t]he appropriate question is not
whether the entire claim as a whole was ‘well-understood, routine [and] conventional’
to a skilled artisan (i.e., whether it lacks novelty).” 93 Then, the court proposed that
“there are two distinct questions: (1) whether each of ‘the [elements] in the claimed
[product] (apart from the natural laws themselves) involve well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field’ and (2) whether
all of the steps “as an ordered combination add[ ] nothing to the laws of nature that is
not already present when the steps are considered separately.”94
The Chamberlain approach does not focus on an inventive concept or
additional features as the traditional application does. Rather, it looks to each claim
limitation individually. Recently, the Chamberlain approach has been embraced by
some district courts.95 However, it is unclear whether the Chamberlain approach is a
86 Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added
and alterations in original). See also In re Rudy, 956 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“And our steptwo analysis is equally applicable because ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry’ cannot provide an inventive concept.”).
87 ChargePoint, Inc., 920 F.3d at 773 (emphasis added).
88 See Chen, Federal Circuit’s Unconventionality Approach, supra note 74, at 338–53.
89 Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1350.
90 Id. (emphasis added).
91 Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
92 Id. at 1318 (emphasis added).
93 Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., 935 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(second alteration in original).
94 Id. at 1349 (emphasis in original, alternations, except for the last one, in original, and
international citations omitted).
95 See, e.g., Tenaha Licensing LLC v. Tigerconnect, Inc., No. CV 19-1400-LPS-SRF, 2020 WL
30426, at *8 (D. Del. Jan. 2, 2020); Tenaha Licensing LLC v. Ascom (US) Inc., No. CV 19-568-LPSSRF, 2020 WL 30427, at *8 (D. Del. Jan. 2, 2020); Tenaha Licensing LLC v. Vocera Commc’ns, Inc.,
No. CV 19-208-LPS-SRF, 2020 WL 30489, at *8 (D. Del. Jan. 2, 2020); Personalized Media Commc’ns,
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conflict within the Federal Circuit case law. In Yu v. Apple Inc., the district court
adopted the Chamberlain approach and criticized that the plaintiff showed “no
evidence or good argument that these elements individually were not ‘well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” 96 But, on appeal,
the Federal Circuit did not review the Chamberlain approach, while it found that the
representative claim was “recited at a high level of generality and merely invokes wellunderstood, routine, conventional components to apply the abstract idea identified
above.”97
Finally, as the Federal Circuit in Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades
Software Inc. has suggested, “[i]n a situation where the specification admits the
additional claim elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional, it will be
difficult, if not impossible, for a patentee to show a genuine dispute.”98 For example, in
Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., the alleged inventive concept was a
sender-generated barcode.99 There, the Federal Circuit reviewed the specification and
found that the alleged inventive features were commonplace, well-known or
conventional.100 The Federal Circuit also determined that “[t]he fact that many of [the
asserted] technologies [implementing the alleged inventive concept] were well-known
can be discerned from [the disputed] patents themselves.” 101 Ultimately, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on the patent-ineligibility of the disputed
claims.102

LLC v. Netflix Inc., 475 F. Supp. 3d 289, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Vaporstream, Inc. v. Snap Inc., No. 2:17cv-00220-MLH (KSx), 2020 WL 978731, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2020) (referring to the Chamberlain
approach as the “inventive concept” step); Yu v. Apple Inc., No. 3:18-CV-06181-JD, 2020 WL 1429773,
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020), aff’d, 1 F.4th 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,
No. 17-CV-05928-YGR, 2021 WL 1421612, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2021); Jacob’s Jewelry Co., Ltd. v.
Tiffany & Co., No. 20 CIV. 4291 (KPF), 2021 WL 2651656, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2021).
96 Yu v. Apple Inc., No. 3:18-CV-06181-JD, 2020 WL 1429773, at *5, *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020).
97 Yu v. Apple Inc., 1 F.4th 1040, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
98 Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(emphasis added).
99 Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
100 Id. at 912.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S EFFORTS TO CREATE A BRIGHT-LINE RULE FOR THE ALICE
STANDARD
A. Definition of a Bright-Line Rule
Some commentators referred to the Supreme Court’s rule excluding three
patent-ineligible subject matters from patent protection as a bright-line rule because
the rule provides no exceptions.103 On the opposite, some commentators observed that
the Supreme Court has consistently refused to impose a bright-line rule on patenteligibility.104 Thus, what a bright-line rule is depends on whether such a rule has
established a recognized bright line.
Here, a bright-line rule means a rule providing explanatory requirements, for
example the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation (“MOT”) test. The MOT test
was used for determining patent-eligibility and provided that a claim may satisfy 35
U.S.C. § 101 if the “claim is tied to a particular machine” or the “claim transforms an
article.” 105 The MOT test also took into considerations that “the use of a specific
machine or transformation of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim’s
scope to impart patent-eligibility” and that “the involvement of the machine or
transformation in the claimed process must not merely be insignificant extra-solution
activity.”106 The MOT test as a positive rule would provide predictability of patenteligibility analysis.107
Before Alice, the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos abrogated the MOT test
primarily because the test was treated as the solo test for patent-eligibility.108 However,
in the post-Alice era, the Federal Circuit has established a MOT-like test for applying
the Alice standard.
B. Step One
Regarding step one, the Federal Circuit has crystalized the improvement test
requiring that a patent-eligible claim focus on a technological solution to a specific
problem caused by, for instance, computers or computer networks and recite features

103 See David Swetnam-Burland & Stacy O. Stitham, Alice’s Adventures in Oz: Revealing the Man
Behind the Curtain, 9 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 29, 39 (2015) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s approach
to the Alice standard).
104 See, e.g., Aashish R. Karkhanis, Quantifying Patent Eligibility Judgments, 15 WAKE FOREST
J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 203, 224–25 (2014) (illustrating the impacts of Alice Corp. Pty.); Krystina
L. Ho, America Invents-and So Can You? The Dichotomy of Subject-Matter Eligibility Challenges in
Post-Grant Proceedings, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1521, 1530–31 (2015) (stating that there is no definitive
test for patent-eligibility).
105 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
106 Id. at 961–62.
107 See William Michael Schuster, Predictability and Patentable Processes: The Federal Circuit's
in Re Bilski Decision and Its Effect on the Incentive to Invent, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, at 27
(2009)
(describing
the
benefits
of
the
MOT),
available
at
https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/stlr/article/view/3841/1633 (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
108 See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604. See also David Swetnam-Burland & Stacy O. Stitham, Patent Law
101: The Threshold Test As Threshing Machine, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 135, 138 (2013) (describing
how Bilski v. Kappos has impacted on the Federal Circuit’s Patent-Eligibility Jurisprudence).
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considered as “a ‘specific’ improvement in computer capabilities or network
functionality.”109
Although a patent-eligible claim is not required to be tied to a particular
machine, the Federal Circuit’s step one analysis does look for machinery nature of an
alleged technological solution or specific improvement.110 For instance, in SRI Int’l, Inc.
v. Cisco Sys., Inc., the representative claim recited:
A computer-automated method of hierarchical event monitoring and
analysis within an enterprise network comprising: deploying a plurality
of network monitors in the enterprise network; detecting, by the network
monitors, suspicious network activity based on analysis of network
traffic data selected from one or more of the following categories:
{network packet data transfer commands, network packet data transfer
errors, network packet data volume, network connection requests,
network connection denials, error codes included in a network packet,
network connection acknowledgements, and network packets indicative
of well-known network-service protocols}; generating, by the monitors,
reports of said suspicious activity; and automatically receiving and
integrating the reports of suspicious activity, by one or more hierarchical
monitors.111
The Federal Circuit found the disputed claims “directed to using a specific
technique [] to solve a technological problem arising in computer networks.” 112 The
identified specific technique was use of “a plurality of network monitors” for analyzing
“specific types of data on the network.”113
In Ancora Techs., Inc., the representative claim recited:
A method of restricting software operation within a license for use with
a computer including an erasable, non-volatile memory area of a BIOS
of the computer, and a volatile memory area; the method comprising
the steps of: selecting a program residing in the volatile memory, using
an agent to set up a verification structure in the erasable, non-volatile
memory of the BIOS, the verification structure accommodating data
that includes at least one license record, verifying the program using
at least the verification structure from the erasable non-volatile
memory of the BIOS, and acting on the program according to the
verification.114

See TecSec, Inc., 978 F.3d at 1293.
See infra Part IV.B.
111 SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 930 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (emphasis added)
(quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,711,615 claim 1).
112 Id. at 1303.
113 Id. (emphasis added).
114 Ancora Techs., Inc., 908 F.3d at 1345–46 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,411,941
claim 1).
109
110
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The disputed claims were found “directed to a solution to a computerfunctionality problem.”115 The Federal Circuit noted that the identified functionality
improvement was built on “a structure containing a license record” which “is stored in
a particular, modifiable, non-volatile portion of the computer’s BIOS” and “used for
verification by interacting with the distinct computer memory that contains the
program to be verified.”116
SRI and Ancora indicate that an alleged technological solution must
encompass physical components arranged specifically for solving the designated
problem.117 However, those physical components should not be a functional term.118
For instance, in Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., the disputed claims
were found “directed to the abstract idea of controlling access to, or limiting permission
to, resources.”119 The representative claim recited:
A system for controlling access to a platform, the system comprising: a
platform having a software services component and an interface
component, the interface component having at least one interface for
providing access to the software services component for enabling
application domain software to be installed, loaded, and run in the
platform; an access controller for controlling access to the software
services component by a requesting application domain software via
the at least one interface, the access controller comprising: an
interception module for receiving a request from the requesting
application domain software to access the software services component;
and a decision entity for determining if the request should be granted
wherein the decision entity is a security access manager, the security
access manager holding access and permission policies; and wherein
the requesting application domain software is granted access to the
software services component via the at least one interface if the request
is granted.120
The patentee identified “the process of requesting and controlling access as
recited in the claim [as] a specific technique for improving computer performance.” 121
But, the Federal Circuit opined that the disputed claims were “drafted functionally”
and “silent as to how access is controlled.” 122 In fact, relying on the specification, the
Federal Circuit criticized that the terms “access controller,” “interception module,”
“decision entity” and “security access manager” were merely four functional computer
components that together failed to specify how the representative claim controls access
to a platform.123

Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1348–49 (emphasis added).
117 See supra Part IV.B.
118 See infra Part IV.B.
119 Ericsson Inc., 955 F.3d at 1326.
120 Id. at 1325–26 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,149,510 claim 1).
121 Id. at 1328.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1326.
115
116
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Moreover, when a disputed claim focuses on pure information processing, the
Federal Circuit focuses more on functionality improvement without identifying
physical arrangement.124 For example, in Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, one
of the disputed patents was found “directed to a specific method for navigating through
three-dimensional electronic spreadsheets.” 125 The identified improvement was
“allow[ing] computers, for the first time, to provide rapid access to and processing of
information in different spreadsheets” and users to easily navigating threedimensional spreadsheets.126 The Federal Circuit held that the representative claim
recited the “technical solution and improvement in computer spreadsheet
functionality.”127 Specifically, the Federal Circuit pointed to several claimed features:
(1) “displaying on a screen display a row of spreadsheet page identifiers [(each shown
as a notebook tab)] along one side of the first spreadsheet page”; (2) “require[ing] at
least one user-settable identifying character to label the notebook tab”; (3) “navigating
through the various spreadsheet pages through selection of the notebook tabs”; (4)
“requir[ing] a formula that uses the identifying character to operate on information
spread between different spreadsheet pages that are identified by their tabs.” 128
Therefore, the Federal Circuit opined that the representative claim was not an “idea
See infra Part IV.B.
Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1007–08 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
126 Id. at 1008.
127 Id.
128 Id. There, the representative patent-eligible claim recited:
124
125

In an electronic spreadsheet system for storing and manipulating information, a
computer-implemented method of representing a three-dimensional spreadsheet on a screen
display, the method comprising:
displaying on said screen display a first spreadsheet page from a plurality of
spreadsheet pages, each of said spreadsheet pages comprising an array of information cells
arranged in row and column format, at least some of said information cells storing usersupplied information and formulas operative on said user-supplied information, each of said
information cells being uniquely identified by a spreadsheet page identifier, a column
identifier, and a row identifier;
while displaying said first spreadsheet page, displaying a row of spreadsheet page
identifiers along one side of said first spreadsheet page, each said spreadsheet page identifier
being displayed as an image of a notebook tab on said screen display and indicating a single
respective spreadsheet page, wherein at least one spreadsheet page identifier of said
displayed row of spreadsheet page identifiers comprises at least one user-settable identifying
character;
receiving user input for requesting display of a second spreadsheet page in response to
selection with an input device of a spreadsheet page identifier for said second spreadsheet
page;
in response to said receiving user input step, displaying said second spreadsheet page
on said screen display in a manner so as to obscure said first spreadsheet page from display
while continuing to display at least a portion of said row of spreadsheet page identifiers; and
receiving user input for entering a formula in a cell on said second spreadsheet page,
said formula including a cell reference to a particular cell on another of said spreadsheet
pages having a particular spreadsheet page identifier comprising at least one user-supplied
identifying character, said cell reference comprising said at least one user-supplied
identifying character for said particular spreadsheet page identifier together with said
column identifier and said row identifier for said particular cell.
Id. at 1005 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,590,259 claim 12).
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of navigating through spreadsheet pages using buttons or a generic method of labeling
and organizing spreadsheets.”129 Rather, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
representative claim utilized “a specific interface and implementation for navigating
complex three-dimensional spreadsheets using techniques unique to computers.”130
Another example is Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., where the
representative claim recited:
A method comprising: receiving by an inspector a Downloadable;
generating by the inspector a first Downloadable security profile that
identifies suspicious code in the received Downloadable; and linking by
the inspector the first Downloadable security profile to the
Downloadable before a web server makes the Downloadable available
to web clients.131
The claimed “security profile” was required to “include the information about
potentially hostile operations produced by a ‘behavior-based’ virus scan.” 132 The
Federal Circuit considered the “behavior-based” virus scan as an improvement in
computer functionality.133 Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the “behaviorbased” virus scan can detect previously-unknown viruses or anti-detection known
viruses by “analyz[ing] a downloadable’s code and determin[ing] whether it performs
potentially dangerous or unwanted operations.” 134 The Federal Circuit commented
that the “behavior-based” virus scan was “distinguished from traditional, ‘codematching’ virus scans” that merely compare a downloadable file with known viruses.135
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the disputed claims were “directed to a nonabstract improvement in computer functionality, rather than the abstract idea of
computer security writ large.”136
C. Step Two
Regarding step two, the Federal Circuit has provided a negative rule requiring
that an alleged inventive concept is not “well-understood, routine, conventional
activity” previously known to the industry or in the relevant field. 137 However, this
approach has become an easy way to reach a patent-ineligibility decision. 138 For
instance, in Universal Secure Registry LLC v. Apple Inc., the Federal Circuit found
that the asserted inventive concept was “conventional and long-standing” as the
specification has described.139
Id. at 1008–09 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
131 Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis added)
(quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,154,844 claim 1).
132 Id. at 1304 (emphasis in original).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.at 1305.
137 See supra Part III.
138 See infra Part IV.C.
139 See Universal Secure Registry LLC v. Apple Inc., 10 F.4th 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
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Under this negative rule, a patentee may rely on an unconventional
arrangement of conventional elements to pass step two. 140 For example, in Amdocs
(Israel) Ltd., the Federal Circuit considered the unconventional architecture of the
claimed system as an inventive concept embraced by the disputed claim. 141 The
disputed claim recited a computer program product that is implemented in the claimed
system composed of physical components, such as network devices, information source
modules (“ISMs”), gatherers, a central event manager (“CEM”), a central database, a
user interface server, and terminals or clients. 142 The disputed claim comprised
arguably-generic limitations, such as “computer code for storing the plurality of data
records in a database,” “computer code for outputting a report based on the queries.”143
However, the disputed claim had other limitations that together constitute an
inventive concept. 144 These inventive limitations included: (1) “computer code for
collecting network communications usage information in real-time from a plurality of
network devices at a plurality of layers”; (2) “computer code for filtering and
aggregating the network communications usage information”; and (3) “computer code
for completing a plurality of data records from the filtered and aggregated network
communications usage information, the plurality of data records corresponding to
network usage by a plurality of users.”145 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that the
claimed collecting, filtering, aggregating, and completing steps “all depend[ed] upon
the [claimed] system’s unconventional distributed architecture” and that “the ordered
combination of these limitations yield[ed] an inventive concept.”146
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court in Alice may create an ambiguous standard for
determining whether a claim is patent-eligible, the Federal Circuit has provided
workable guidance for lower courts to apply the Alice standard.
Regarding step one, the Federal Circuit requires considering the entirety of a
disputed claim and consulting the specification that helps understand the disputed
claim. The Federal Circuit also emphasizes that prior art as extrinsic evidence should
be disregarded unless they overwhelmingly show that the disputed claim is directed to
a patent-ineligible subject matter.
To pass step one, a plaintiff may assert that a claim offers an advance over the
prior art by showing any specific features the claimed invention has included to
improve functionality. On the other hand, the Federal Circuit has provided a laundry
list of patent-ineligible subject matters. Consequently, the focus of patent-eligibility
has to be on step two.

140 See Ping-Hsun Chen, Questionable Patent-Eligibility of IoT Technology, 22 MARQ . INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 165, 181–83 (2018) (discussing a case concerning “an unconventional system composed
of existing devices” which constitutes an inventive concept).
141 See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd., 841 F.3d at 1301–04 (discussing the patent-eligibility issue of claim
16 of U.S. Patent No. 7,412,510).
142 Id. at 1291, 1302.
143 Id. 1302-03 (citing U.S. Patent No. 7,412,510 claim 16).
144 Id. at 1303.
145 Id. 1302–03.
146 Id. at 1303.
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Regarding step two, the Federal Circuit may have established a bright-line rule
and requires showing that an inventive concept is more than a “well-understood,
routine, conventional” activity known to the industry. Thus, a plaintiff has to illustrate
how the alleged inventive concept is not “well-understood, routine, conventional.”
However, the ultimate challenge depends on whether the specification expresses that
such an inventive concept is well-understood, routine, or conventional.

